We analyze the economic forces underlying cross-border Mergers and Acquistions (M&As) using a large bilateral panel data set. The frequent occurrence of "zero" observations provides essential information on the structure of M&A flows, which we model empirically using a two-stage procedure. At the fist stage, an observation is either classified in the Passive Group (always zero) or in the (potentially) Active Group using a logit model. At the second stage, the size of M&A flows in the Active Group is modeled using a gravity-type negative binomial model. We find that: (i) market size (GDP) of both acquirer and target is more important for trade flows than for cross-border M&As, (ii) market development (per capita GDP) is more important for cross-border M&As than for trade flows, (iii) for M&As, the target's market, both in size and development, is more important than the acquirer's market, and (iv) the impact of distance is larger on trade flows than for M&As. Financial openness is a prerequisite for becoming active in M&As and positively influences the size of M&A flows. Our estimates on the direction, size, and significance of the main variables are robust for alternative specifications, incorporating lagged stock market value, black market premium, real interest rates, transparency, and exchange rate variability. Finally, we provide additional support and extend the recent results of Blonigen et al. (2007) 
Introduction
According to UNCTAD (World Investment Report, 2007) 1 The predominant role of M&As in FDI has received considerable attention in the literature over the past couple of years (see below). Our main contributions in this paper are six-fold. First, we extend the important work of di Giovanni (2005) by focusing on the number of bilateral cross-border M&As, covering virtually all countries in the world over a 20 year period. Second, we take full account of the specific structure of M&A flows, in which "zero" observations (country i does not acquire any firm in country j in a given year) occur frequently for two reasons, namely either as the equilibrium outcome for an active country pair or because the country pair is not active in the global M&A game. Based on theoretical considerations (e.g. Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2007, or Bergstrand and Egger, 2007) we model this empirically using a two-stage procedure. At the fist stage, an observation is either classified in the Passive Group (always zero) or in the (potentially) Active Group using a logit model. At the second stage, the size of M&A flows in the Active Group is modeled using a gravity-type negative binomial model. Figure 1a shows the the inter-and intra-regional cross-border M&A connections for the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] for the number of deals (see Table B .2 in the appendix for details, also regarding the value of deals). Only 22 of the 81 different connections are shown in Figure 1a as the other 59 are rounded to 0 per cent. First, we note that by far the largest M&A flows are within and between Western Europe and North America, accounting for almost 60 per cent of all cross-border M&A activity. These regions have large markets, with high income per capita, and are relatively close-by. Second, we note that there are also connections from there to the other high income region (AustralAsia). Third, we note that there is a regional connection between high income regions and their close-by neighbours (Eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia and Pacific). Fourth, most of the developing world (Sub-Sahara Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East & North Africa) is hardly active at all in the global M&A game.
The observations above for M&As are similar to those for international trade flows, which are well-explained empirically by 'gravity-type' equations. For comparison, we depict the trade connections in Figure 1b to show that the same four observations hold, although the role of Western Europe and North America is more dominant for M&As than for trade flows, and vice versa for the role of AustralAsia. The objective of this paper is to empirically explain the global distribution of cross-border M&As and to better understand the differences between M&A flows and trade flows as depicted in panels a and b of Figure 1 . Inspired by the recent developments in gravity analysis for trade flows, our methodology will take full account of zero-flows as containing useful information by effectively combining the estimation procedures of Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2007) . Eaton and Tamura (1994) Japanese and U.S. bilateral trade flows and FDI positions for around 100 countries 1985 -1990 Brainard (1997 Outward activity (sales and exports) and inward activity (sales and imports) relative to US; 63 tradeable sectors, 27 countries 1989 cross-section Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) Sales of foreign affiliates, bilateral data of 36 countries with the US 1986-1994 Blonigen and Davies (2004) Estimate the impact of bilateral tax treaties using both US inbound and outbound This study Bilateral cross-border M&As, 200+ countries 1986 M&As, 200+ countries -2005 Inspired by the similarities depicted in Figure 1 as well as the long tradition and empirical success of gravity-type studies on trade flows (see section 4), the recent FDI/M&A literature has turned attention to gravity-type specifications, see Table 1 .
Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, p. 32) conclude: "the cross-country pattern of FDI is quite well approximated by the 'gravity' relationship," while Blonigen et al. (2007, p. 1309) note that: "a ''gravity'' specification .. is arguably the most widely used empirical specification of FDI." As indicated in Table 1 , for various data-related reasons most studies focus on american multinationals, activities relative to the USA, or FDI for the major developed economies (OECD). The estimates are usually based on FDI stocks or sales of foreign affiliates, not on flows. This makes direct comparison of estimated elasticities, for example, troublesome. Our approach is most closely related to the work of di Giovanni (2005) , who analyzes the values of cross-border M&A flows.
The methodology is slightly different as he focuses on positive values after correcting for censoring bias using a Tobit model. Instead, we focus on the number of deals (with some attention for their value as well) for an extended period, including zero observations in a two-stage zero-inflated logit-negative binomial model, see section 4.
The first-stage results, determining whether an observation is active or not in global M&As, is crucial for understanding the pattern of M&As depicted in Figure 1a .
Section 2 discusses the motivation and theoretical background. Section 3 provides data sources and a description of the data. Section 4 explains the empirical procedure used. Section 5 gives the main results and discusses the characterization of global M&A flows (thus explaining the first part of the title of the paper). Section 6 investigates robustness and various alternatives. Section 7 extends recent work on surrounding-market potential and rest of world GDP. Section 8 concludes.
Motivation and theoretical background
The extent of financial market liberalization around the world increased significantly during the late 1980s and 1990s, driven by investment flows seeking higher returns and risk diversification. Many developing and transition economies in East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, in particular, removed restrictions on financial transactions, relaxed domestic regulations, and moved away from regimes of financial repression. The increase in the degree of integration of world capital markets was accompanied by a significant increase in private capital flows to developing countries.
Access to world capital markets allows countries to borrow in order to smooth consumption in the face of adverse shocks, while the potential growth and welfare gains resulting from international risk sharing can be large (Obstfeld, 1994) . FDI may also have significant indirect long-run effects. As emphasized by Berthélemy and Demurger (2000) , Borensztein et al. (1998), and Grossman and Helpman (1991) , FDI may smooth the transfer or diffusion of managerial and technological know-how, particularly in the form of new varieties of capital inputs; furthermore, it can improve the skills composition of the labor force as a result of "learning by doing" effects, investment in formal education, and on-the-job training. In addition, as suggested by Markusen and Venables (1999) , although the increased degree of competition in the product and factor markets stimulated by FDI may tend to reduce profits of local firms, spillover effects through linkages to supplier industries may reduce input costs, raise profits, and encourage domestic investment. At the same time, it is recognized that volatility risk and sudden reversals in capital flows in the context of highly open capital accounts may represent a significant cost. Concerns associated with such reversals were heightened by various financial crises (Williamson and Mahar, 1998) . A number of papers has looked at the FDI-growth nexus, with inconclusive results (see Durham, 2004; Li and Liu, 2005) . There is some consensus that FDI is beneficial when compared to other types of capital inflows, such as portfolio investment or syndicated bank loans. Additional research tries to identify other features unique to FDI, such as its relative permanence or the positive externalities it generates (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1996; Sarno and Taylor, 1999) . Most countries vigorously pursue policies aimed at encouraging FDI inflows.
Multilateral organizations (OECD, WTO, and IMF) have also been supporters of FDI, with liberalization of the capital account as a common prescription. Limited empirical work has been done to examine the impact of financial openness on FDI inflows, and especially on cross-border M&As. implying the need to go beyond the OLI-categorization scheme (Dunning, 1993) to understand these developments in a micro-economic model.
Cross-border M&As are the largest component of FDI, the remainder being greenfield investments. The main difference between these two forms of investments is that in an M&A "control of assets and operations is transferred from a local to a foreign company, the former becoming an affiliate of the latter" (UNCTAD, 2000) . What drives international capital flows and what explicates their cyclicality is a question of utmost importance for both academics and policymakers. Early contributions to this literature analyzed "pull" and "push" factors in total capital flows (Agénor, 1998) , stressing the important role of U.S. interest rates as a "push" factor (Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1996; Calvo et al., 1996) . A more recent strand of literature has focused on the push and pull factors of specific types of capital, namely portfolio equity (Griffin et al., 2004) , and FDI (Albuquerque et al., 2005 Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that firms in countries with weak investor protection are more likely to be acquired, whereas buyers are more likely to be from countries with relatively strong investor protection.
Data
Appendix A gives an overview of the sources and variables we use. million, which provided us with 27,118 cross-border M&As, see Table 3 . There is usually no or only a very short time difference between the date of announcement of a M&A deal and the date the deal is effective The announced date is the same as the effective date for about 38 per cent of the M&A deals, and on average the difference between these two dates is 0.18 years (Brakman, Garretsen, van Marrewijk, 2007 Figure 2b depicts the evolution of all cross-border M&As over the last twenty years, both measured as the number of deals and the value of deals (in constant 2005 $ bn., using the US GDP deflator). Clearly, there is substantial variation over time, with periods of rapid increase followed by periods of rapid decline. Five merger waves have been identified during the 20 th century, three of which are recent (Andrade et al., 2001 Figure 2b shows that a subsequent (still ongoing) 6 th merger wave started around 2003. Substantial research has been devoted to understanding what drives U.S. domestic merger waves (Evenett, 2004) . The literature classifies merger waves into three categories: neoclassical, strategic, and mis-valuation. Neoclassical theories emphasize the role of deregulatory and technological shocks at the industry level (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002) . Strategic theories (Toxvaerd, 2007) , focus on the relative scarcity of targets with a relationship to the acquirers. Mis-valuation theories focus on heterogeneity, that is in the perception of the value of the traded assets by the agents (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004) . Empirically, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005) argue that industry-specific shocks lead to industry waves (a necessary, but not sufficient condition according to Harford) . Gugler et al. (2003) argue that merger waves do not boost efficiency but are the result of overvalued shares and managerial discretion. Andrade et al. (2001) show (for publicly traded US firms) that with each merger wave the value of the M&A deals (measured by firms' market capitalization) increases. Neary (2007) explains merger waves in a game-theoretic approach, where general equilibrium conditions finally stop the wave.
It has long been recognized that it is complicated to measure the extent of openness in capital account transactions (Eichengreen, 2001; Edison et al., 2004) . 4 Conventional measures fail to account for the intensity of capital controls. IMF-based variables are too aggregated to illustrate the complexity of actual capital controls (which can differ depending on the direction and type of capital flows). Moreover, it is hard to distinguish between de jure and de facto controls on capital transactions (Rajan, 2003;  the private sector may circumvent capital account restrictions, Edwards, 1999) . We rely on the financial liberalization index developed by Chinn and Ito (2002) , which is the first principle component of four IMF binary variables. 5 It measures the intensity of capital controls insofar as this is correlated with the existence of other restrictions on international transactions (Chinn and Ito, 2005) . Moreover, it is widely available for more than 150 countries in the period 1970 through 2005.
Theoretically, FDI may be a substitute or a complement to trade in goods (Mundell, 1957; Markusen, 1997) . Empirically, Figure 1 illustrates that FDI and trade are 4 See Edison et al. (2004) for discussions and comparisons of various measures on capital restrictions. 5 These are binary variables created based on a set of "on-off" clarifications, which includes an indicator variable for the existence of multiple exchange rates (k1); restrictions on current account (k2); capital account transactions (k3); and a variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds (k4); where k3 is the one most often used for capital controls.
positively correlated. 6 As empirical complementarities, one expects a negative impact of distance between acquirer and target on M&A flows. Information costs can also play a role for the investment decision of firms (Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996; Martin and Rey, 2004; Portes and Rey, 2005) . De Ménil (1999) uses distance as a proxy for information costs. In addition, we consider a common language, common border, and common colonial experience as potential factors for reducing the costs of doing business (all taken from the CEPII database). Indicators of market potential (GDP) and market development (per capita GDP) are taken from Angus Maddison (2007). 
The Poisson distribution imposes the restriction that the mean is equal to the variance, that is ) var( ) (
In practice, the PRM rarely fits in most empirical studies due to overdispersion, indicating that the variance exceeds the expected value. The NBRM addresses this issue by adding a parameter reflecting unobserved heterogeneity among observations: (2001) who show that firms engage in both intra-industry FDI and intraindustry trade at the same time. Markusen (1997) provides "knowledge-capital" models, which allow for horizontal and vertical integration of firms accross countries in the presence of trade costs among other factors. 7 See Table B .3 for descriptive statistics of the variables used in this paper. respect to the gravity model popular in international trade. Pioneered empirically by Tinbergen (1962) and Linneman (1966) , theoretical foundations are provided in a variety of settings, see e.g. Anderson (1979) , Bergstrand (1985) , and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) . If The distinction of two different types of groups is similar in spirit to Heckman's (1979) analysis of sample selection and specification error.
Returning to FDI flows in general and M&As in particular, the empirical tradition to explain FDI flows using gravity models is more recent, less extensive, and less abundant (see the introduction). Unlike its trade counterpart, we are only aware of one theoretical foundation for the use of gravity models in FDI, provided recently by Bergstrand and Egger (2007) The above discussion indicates that we should distinguish between two groups of observations to adequately deal with the zero-flow problem (in our M&A setting about 98 percent of the total number of observations). This can be done in an empirically flexible way by using Lambert's (1992) zero-inflated approach. 12 The zero-inflated model assumes that there are two latent groups of observations on crossborder bilateral M&As. An observation in the (always 0) Passive Group has an outcome of 0 with a probability of 1. A country in the (potentially) Active Group might have a zero outcome, but there is a positive probability that there is a non-zero outcome. This process is developed in two stages: (i) model membership into the latent groups (Active or Passive) and (ii) model counts for those in the Active Group.
Ad (i). Latent group membership. Let i y be a binary indicator of membership in the Passive Group ( p y i = ) or the Active Group ( a y i = ) for observation i. As group membership is not directly observable but depends on observable characteristics i z , it can be empirically estimated using a binary regression model, such as logit or probit.
By definition, the count for an observation from the Passive Group is zero.
Ad (ii) Counts for the active group. Given that an observation is from the Active Group, we can model the number of M&As using a count model based on the observed characteristics i x .
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10 FAS = Foreign Affiliate Sales. 11 Both countries must be active in a sector and it must be profitable to take over another firm; roughly translated this means differences in comparative advantage must not be too large nor too small. 12 This avoids the difficulty of trying to find an appropriate exclusion restriction (Helpman et al, 2007) . Alternative names for zero-inflated models are "with zeroes", "zero altered", and "hurdle" models. 13 The characteristics The above discussion identifies four main count models, namely PRM, NBRM, ZeroInflated Poisson (ZIP), and Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB), which raises the question of empirical model selection.
14 A standard Cameron and Trivedi (1986) procedure favours the NBRM over the PRM due to overdispersion. The latter, however, may also be due to excess zeros created by two separate processes -Active and Passive observations -as modelled above. If so, the ZIP model increases the conditional variance and the probability of zero counts may be sufficient to deal with the overdispersion problem. Alternatively, even after using two separate processes, there may still be overdispersion in the data for the Active Group. This problem can be addressed by using the ZINB model. The Vuong (1989) test can be used for selection of non-nested models. It provides overwhelming support in favour of ZIP versus PRM, in favour of ZINB versus NBRM, and (for the baseline case discussed below) in favour of ZINB versus ZIP. As summarized in Figure 4 , the discussion below therefore only reports the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) estimates, using a logit binary regression model at the first stage.
Results
Part of our economic interpretation of the estimated coefficients below is based on the odds ratio and the incidence rate ratio. For the first stage of the estimation procedure,
be the odds of a passive outcome versus an active one in the logit model. Suppose b is the estimated coefficient for some variable, and δ the (i) results in the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial model. Note that the outcome can be zero even though it is an observation from the Active Group. 14 Six if we include the distinction between using probit and logit at the first stage of the zero inflated models; as the logit specification performed better we restrict attention to this possibility, which has the added benefit of using the odds ratio for economic interpretation.
standard deviation for non-dummy variables (respectively, a unit change for dummy variables Notes: dependent variable is number of deals; GDPpc = GDP per capita; Dist ij = distance between i and j; * , ** , and *** are 10%, 5%, and 1% significant, respectively; st dev = standard deviation; + incidence rate ratio is calculated as discrete change from 0 to 1; basic 1 regression includes time fixed effects (no waves)
Passive Group (first stage, logit)
The bottom part of Table 4 indicates whether an observation belongs to the Passive Group (always 0) or the Active Group (potentially positive). The estimates can be interpreted as in a standard logit model, determining the probability that the observation should be classified in the Passive Group. With the exception of the target's per capita GDP (which is not significant), all included variables are important for the Passive Group -Active Group classification. 16 We list the impact of the significant variables in decreasing order of economic magnitude, first for the continuous variables and then for the dummy control variables.
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In order of magnitude, an observation is more likely to belong to the Passive Group:
1. The lower the acquirer's development level as measured by GDP per capita.
2. The smaller the acquirer's market size as measured by total GDP.
3. The greater the distance to a potential target country.
4. The smaller the target's market size as measured by total GDP.
5. The lower the acquirer's financial openness.
6. The lower the target's financial openness.
Similarly, for the dummy control variables, in order of magnitude an observation is less likely to belong to the Passive Group if:
1. The two countries share a common border.
2. The two countries share a common language. 16 The target's per capita GDP does play an important role in determining the number of deals within the Active Group, see below. 17 Recall that the magnitude of positive and negative effects should be compared using the inverse.
The economic importance of financial openness for acquirer and target is fairly modest (a percent change in the odds ratio of -21 and -10 percent, respectively, see Table 4 ).
Active Group (second stage, negative binomial)
The top part of Table 4 indicates the size of cross-border M&As (as measured by their number) given that the observation belongs to the Active Group. The estimates can be interpreted as in a standard negative binomial model, determining the expected number of M&As given the observed characteristics. All estimated coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level or stronger.
In order of economic magnitude, given that an observation belongs to the Active Group, the expected number of M&As increases:
1. The higher the target's market size as measured by total GDP.
2. The higher the acquirer's market size as measured by total GDP.
3. The higher the target's development level as measured by GDP per capita.
4. The higher the acquirer's development level as measured by GDP per capita.
5. The lower the distance to a potential target country.
6. The higher the one-year lagged wave variable.
7. The higher the acquirer's financial openness.
8. The higher the target's financial openness.
9. The higher the two-year lagged wave variable.
Similarly, for the dummy control variables given that an observation belongs to the Active Group and in order of magnitude, the expected number of M&As increases if:
1. The two countries share a colonial history.
2. The two countries share a common language.
3. The two countries do not share a common border.
To determine the size of cross-border M&As, market access as measured by the target's total GDP is by far the most important variable (a standard deviation increase raises the expected number of counts by 252 percent), followed by market size of the acquirer (indicative of the potential number of acquiring firms). Development levels of both acquirer and target as measured by GDP per capita are also important (positively), followed by the distance between acquirer and target (negatively). The economic impact of the financial openness and wave variables is more modest (fairly low percentage changes in expected counts). For the dummy control variables, mutual knowledge of each other's markets (lower costs of interaction) as measured by a common colonial history and common language is very important, as it raises the expected number of M&As by 120 and 76 percent, respectively. For the Active Group, in contrast to the Passive Group, sharing a common border is less important.
Note that this effect provides some support for the jumping argument as sharing a common border decreases the expected number of counts by 11 percent. Given that a country is active in cross-border M&A activity, this suggests that there is an incentive to create some distance between acquiring and target country. 
Elasticities for Active Group and trade discussion
As noted above, the estimated coefficients for the Active Group of the variables measured in natural logarithms can be interpreted as elasticities. To compare the main economic forces determining cross-border M&As relative to international trade flows, M&As relative to trade flows, as depicted in Figure 1 and Table B .2.
Robustness
This section analyzes the robustness of the baseline case discussed in section 5 by incorporating five other variables identified in the literature that may influence M&A decisions. Details are available in Tables B.4 and B.5 in the appendix.
US yield.
There is a general consensus in the literature that high real interest rates hamper FDI, see Albuquerque et al. (2005) and Calvo et al. (2001) . Using the 10-year US bond yield as a proxy, Table B .4 shows that the interest rate is not important for the first stage Active -Passive distinction and has a negative impact on the number of M&As for the Active Group, as theory predicts (a 100 basis point increase in the US interest rate decreases Active Group M&A activity by 10 percent). 20 In this respect the US yield plays a similar role as the wave variables capturing the business cycle.
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Stock market capitalization. The rise in FDI flows has gravitated towards larger equity emerging markets, bypassing many countries (Montiel and Reinhart, 1999 ). An often given explanation is that a country must meet a threshold set of requirements (market size, accounting standards, disclosure requirements, transparency, etc.) to be able to attract capital. A proxy for the institutional setting is the lagged stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, which is also a proxy for the size of the banking sector, as countries with underdeveloped capital markets tend to have a smaller financial sector. 22 Table B Transparency. An alternative proxy for the institutional setting is the Transparency International index, which ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt) as an indicator for the business environment in an economy. As Table B.4 shows, perhaps surprisingly, we find no support for a positive influence of transparency on global
M&As, neither at the first, prerequisite stage, nor at the second, size stage. Arguably, its impact is already captured by the financial openness variable.
Black market premium. The black market premium of a country's exchange rate can be interpreted both as a measure of expectations of depreciation of the local currency and as a rudimentary index of distortions. 24 This may affect investment through several channels, it is (i) more attractive to hold foreign assets when a depreciation is expected, (ii) economic uncertainty is higher under such conditions, and (iii) for those who can obtain foreign exchange at the official rate, foreign capital goods are cheap to import. The first two points suggest a negative relationship between the black market premium and foreign investment, while the third point implies the opposite.
As an indicator of distortions the black market premium is likely to be negatively correlated with M&As. As Table B .5 shows, at the first stage a black market premium makes it more likely for an acquirer to be passive and for a target to be active. At the second stage, the black market premium has a negative impact on the size of crossborder M&As, both for acquirer and target (a one standard deviation increase in ) 1 ln( BMP + reduces the expected number of M&As by 19 percent for an acquirer and 43 percent for a target). 25 This suggests that the black market premium is a suitable indicator of unsustainable distortions in the economy.
Exchange rate variability. The literature is rather mixed on the link between FDI and exchange rate uncertainty as volatility can both discourage FDI (Cushman, 1988) and produce an incentive to hedge against exchange rate shocks through foreign location (Aizenman, 1991) . Arguably, a floating exchange rate regime creates uncertainty which could make developing countries loose their access to international credit (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000) .
To test these effects we analyze the impact of exchange rate volatility (measured as the coefficient of variation of the bilateral exchange rate).
As Table B .5 shows, exchange rate volatility does not influence the first stage activepassive decision and has only a mild negative influence on the number of M&As for active observations (a one standard deviation increase decreases the expected number of M&As by only 7 percent).
Summary. To summarize the above findings and the overall results of Tables B.4 and B.5, we note that at the first (logit) stage the lagged stock market value for the acquirer and natural logarithm of the black market premium for both acquirer and target are significant influences on the active -passive decision. In these cases, however, the financial openness variable has been dropped from the analysis to avoid multicollineariy problems, such that these explanations can be viewed as substitutes.
Similarly, in the second (negative binomial) stage, we note that the US yield, lagged stock market value for the acquirer and the black market premium for the acquirer and Surrounding market potential. Blonigen et al. (2007; BDWN) analyze inter alia the impact of surrounding-market potential on FDI. It is measured for country j as the inverse-distance-weighted GDPs of all other countries in the world, and therefore similar to Harris's (1954) market potential approach while excluding the target country GDP. The surrounding-market potential should only affect export-platform M&A decisions. Target country GDP is taken up separately in the estimation procedure. 26 Indeed, using data relative to the USA the authors' main findings are (i) a clear rejection of a common coefficient of target country GDP and surroundingmarket potential and (ii) a significant negative coefficient of surrounding-market potential. The latter effect is contrary to expectations and current theoretical explanations. The authors discuss how this may be explained by border effects between neighbouring countries, making the largest country in the area (with the 26 We follow BDWN in normalizing the distance between Amsterdam and Brussels (173 km) to unity. This also holds for lower distances. All other distances receive a weight that declines according to 173/d ij , where d ij is the distance between countries i and j.
smallest surrounding-market potential) the most attractive location for exportplatform FDI. Table 6 (Table 4 above and Brakman, Garita et al., 2008) and when restricting attention only to the OECD countries, both for number of deals and value of M&As. 
Conclusions
We analyze the economic forces underlying cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) using a large bilateral panel data set (211 countries and 20 years). The large share of "zero" observations provides essential information on the structure of these flows, which we model empirically using a two-stage procedure. At the first stage an observation is either classified in the Passive Group (always zero) or in the (potentially) Active Group using a logit model. At the second stage the size of M&A flows in the Active Group are modelled using a gravity-type negative binomial model.
We find that for a bilateral connection to become active in the global M&A game at the first stage, it is crucial to have a sufficiently high level of development as measured by per capita GDP or to share a common border. Other important economic factors for becoming active are the total size of both the acquirer's and target's market, the distance to potential targets, common language, and colonial history.
Imposing restrictions on capital flows (exchange controls, quantitative restrictions, multiple exchange rates, and/or taxes) for acquirer or target is detrimental to the probability of engaging in M&As, but its economic importance on the size of such flows is fairly modest.
To determine the size of cross-border M&As, given that an observation belongs to the Active Group, market access as measured by the target's total GDP is by far the most important variable (a standard deviation increase raises the expected number of counts by 252 percent). This result is followed by market size of the acquirer, which is indicative of the potential number of acquiring firms. Development levels of both acquirer and target as measured by GDP per capita are also important, followed by the distance between acquirer and target. Mutual knowledge of each other's markets (i.e.
lower costs of interaction), as measured by a common colonial history and common language, is also important since it increases the expected number of M&As by 120 and 76 percent, respectively. In relation to the economic impact of "financial openness" and the wave variables, we once again find a positively significant but modest effect.
When comparing estimated elasticities for trade flows and M&As we find: (i) market size (GDP) of both acquirer and target is more important for trade flows than for cross-border M&As, (ii) market development (per capita GDP) is more important for cross-border M&As than for trade flows, indicating that M&As are predominantly a rich-person's game, (iii) for M&As, the target's market, both in size and development, is more important than the acquirer's market, and (iv) the impact of distance is larger on trade flows than for M&As.
Our estimates on the direction, size, and significance of the main variables are robust at both the first and second stage of the procedure for alternative specifications, incorporating lagged stock market value, black market premium, real interest rates, transparency, and exchange rate variability. We provide additional support and extend the recent results of Blonigen et al. (2007; BDWN) and Bergstrand and Egger (2007; B&E) . Using US-based data BDWN find a negative elasticity of surrounding-market potential on the value of FDI. We corroborate their findings using our global M&A data at the second (active) stage, both for the number of deals and their value. In addition, we extend their results at the first stage of our procedure as we find that a larger surrounding-market potential increases the probability for an observation to belong to the Passive Group. Similarly, using OECD-based data B&E find a negative elasticity of Rest of World GDP on the value of FDI. Using our global M&A data, we partially corroborate their findings as we find a similar negative elasticity at the second (active) stage for the value of M&As, but no significant effect for the number of deals. Again, we extend their results at the first stage of our procedure for the value of M&As as we find that a higher value for Rest of World GDP decreases the probability that an observation belongs to the Passive Group. St dev = standard deviation; min = minimum; max = maximum; obs = number of observations Notes: dependent variable is number of deals; GDPpc = GDP per capita; Dist ij = distance between i and j; SMC = stock market capitalization; * , ** , and *** are 10%, 5%, and 1% significant, respectively; st dev = standard deviation; + incidence rate ratio is calculated as discrete change from 0 to 1. Notes: dependent variable is number of deals; GDPpc = GDP per capita; Dist ij = distance between i and j; BMP = black market premium; * , ** , and *** are 10%, 5%, and 1% significant, respectively; st dev = standard deviation; + incidence rate ratio is calculated as discrete change from 0 to 1.
